American Geopolitical Strategy in Europe Since 1990
The "End of the Cold War" and German Unification /
NATO in Europe: Expansion in 1990, 1999, 2004, 2009
- and what's next?
Map of a part of Europe, showing the addition of new members of
NATO since 1952.
Preface
It is obvious that at present, in the spring of 2014,
we are facing a crisis of major proportions in Europe that affects "world
politics" - in other words, the political and economic situation of humanity.
For some it is a crisis "in Ukraine" (a country that a majority of U.S.
citizens cannot locate on a map of the world), for others, a crisis unleashed
by what they term Russian occupation of the Crimean peninsula (an occupation
that in fact, occurred but that has a complex background which requires
to be considered); for still others, it is a conflict between the U.S.
and Russia that has been noticeable for quite a few years already, and
that has come to our attention with great force, as events in Ukraine unfolded
this year,
It cannot be overlooked that all of these interpretations
are, to some extent, justified. As human beings, as citizens rooted in
what amounts to a specific socio-cultural history (and often tied to particular
interests), people tend to view historical developments - and the social
reality they face in a given moment - from specific perspectives. Many
factors influence our perception, and it can turn our that this perception
is too narrowly focused, or too generalizing. Oral history, family history
but also school books, the media, the prevailing type of discourse in our
specific society come into play. It is perhaps a fiction that a sober,
objective, impartial analysis is possible in a world where the material
interests of different "powers" and different classes are divergent, if
not antagonistic, and where ideological coloring of discourses is often
unnoticed by speakers (and the listeners) but nonetheless all the more
present.
If different perspectives of the crisis of 2014 are possible,
this attempt to situate it in a bigger, more profound, ongoing development
that deserves to be called a "long, ongoing, antagonistic crisis" (or conflict)
clearly presents one of several possible view. Those who live in the Baltic
countries, or in Poland (countries that were subjected by Czarist
Russia, and later on experienced the Soviet reality in a painful way while
also adding to the pain of [Soviet] Russian citizens) obviously have
their own story to tell and tend to have their own perspective.
Outsiders may well understand the trauma that resulted
and the specific "security interests" (in the face of a big Eastern neighbor)
that have let them favor "integration" into NATO and the European Union,
while resenting perhaps even the thought of Russian membership in either
NATO or the EU.
But historical experience has not only produced a trauma;
it has also produced resentment. And as happens so often (for who,
in which country, is exempt from it? perhaps very few, a minority, in most
cases, in our present world), it has resulted in a selective memory
that privileges the retelling of one's own suffering while largely ignoring
the suffering afflicted on others. Or how would it be otherwise possible
to feel no shame, in countries like Latvia, in view of the staunch participation
of Lativian SS-troops since 1941, side by side with the Nazi-aggressor,
in genocide against Jews and Slaves and in the fight against the alliance
of Britain, the U.S. and the Soviet Union? How would it be otherwise possible
in Poland to forget that country's expansionist eastward drive, its intervention
in the Russian civil war, its war against a weak and defensive Soviet
Russian Republic, in the years after the end of World War I? Strife between
neighbors rarely has no "pre-history" and it seems that in most cases,
it would rarely allow us to put the blame squarely on one side.
This said, it seems fair to point out that of course feelings
of insecurity in the Baltics and Poland have to be respected, and the same
is true of the wish (if it exists) of the majority of the people in these
countries to belong to a neo-liberal politico-economic union directed by
a Commission that is endowed with exceptional prerogatives (based on treaties,
not popular will) and a parliament with no right to pass laws on its own
accord. But so have the feelings of concern about an increasingly insecure
global situation, that exist in many countries of the world. They are based
on an analysis of NATO expansion since 1989 that implies a different perspective,
by putting this expansion into the context of US-Russian relations and
privileging a view of persisting tension between the US, as the only remaining
superpower since about 1990, and Russia.
For those who do not desire an unipolar global constellation,
the further strenghtening of the remaining superpower and the additional
weakening of Russia must be a cause of concern. The Soviet reality has
not only been painted in dark colors by Western Cold War rhetoric; even
those who shared the ideals underlying the October Revolution question
a lot of what went on in the Soviet Union and within its orbit. But the
remaining superpower has a record that is not as favorable as it has been
painted, at least by most Western media most of the time. A Pax Americana
might well be seen as the era of dominance of a country where an oligarchic,
tiny elite quite ruthlessly pursues its particular interests. This does
have repercussions, and not necessarily favorable ones, all around the
world.
As far as Russia is concerned, it's not only the Western
media (whose owners and editors - and with them, quite often, many of the
employed journalists - make us stubbornly ignore the inadequacy
and endangered reality of democracy in the U.S. and the EU) who point out
the inadequacy of formal democracy in present-day Capitalist Russia. In
Russia, there is a lot of discontent, too, just as in Spain, Portugal,
Greece, Turkey, and a few other European countries. But 70 or 80 per cent
of the adult Russian population, according to an article of the New York
Times, favor the present Russian government's stance in the case of the
present crisis over Crimea and its stance regarding the present Ukrainian
leaders in Kiev. Even Gorbachev sees the reintegration of the Crimea into
Russia as an understandable and historically justified act, and like the
Russian president, he would not like to see a NATO presence in Ukraine
and the Ukraine's informal or formal integration into that military alliance.
Like various observers in the West, Russian leaders see
the NATO presence in the Baltic countries, its moves to integrate the Ukraine
and Georgia, and the determination to establish a "missile defense shield"
as a policy to establish a US nuclear first-strike capability. If achieved,
it would subject future Russian governments to the diktat of the
U.S. elites. And by eliminating the voice of Russia as a (potentially)
independent voice, it would make a similar move against China even more
likely, warding off every attempt of countries in the South to create a
more evenly balanced, fairer, more democratic multi-polar constellation.
Pessimists may see in the present crisis a symptom, comparable
to the crises that foreshadowed World War I. So-called realists will try
to paint such pessimism as unwarranted; they tell us that "deterrence"
has "worked" quite well, that no nuclear power will risk a suicidal big
war; and they forget how close the world was repeatedly, after 1945, to
an accidentally or consciously unleashed World War. The Cuban Crisis should
not be forgotten. If the stationing of missiles on Cuba had proceeded,
everything would have been possible. Likewise, we must asks at least the
question whether a cornered Russian leadership, faced with the on-going
attempt to move nuclear attack weapons (bombers, warships, missiles) so
close to the Russian front door, might not, in desparation, opt for a "first
strike" before the other side does it? A scary question, and human reason
should keep both sides from considering such steps. But which war was unleashed
in this century that was not driven, in hindsight, by an absurd and criminal
rationale?
Promised Detente, Promises of Cooperation, and the Seeming
End of the Cold War
In the 1980s, the crisis over the stationing of median-range
missiles in Germany and Italy and the immense economic and human cost of
the arms race unleashed by the Reagan administration, but also the promises
inscibed in the tactics of Ostpolitik, pursued by West German governments
(Bahr, Genscher, Brandt, finally even Genscher and Kohl) led the Soviet
leadership to rethink certain positions.(1) The unwinnable war waged in
Afghanistan against US-supported insurgents contributed to this process.
Internally, a strategy to broaden popular support by increasing the standard
of living had brought results in the 70s and early 80s but the arms race
had increasingly made the strategy ineffective and thus internal dissatisfaction
increased. (The negative social consequences of the arms race in the U.S.
should not be ignored here, they included the deterioration of public infrastructure
and a vast budget deficit.) The rise of Gorbachev and the increasingly
socioal-democratic positions that replaced the "old thinking" among parts
of the classe politique in the Soviet Union prefigured the diplomatic rapprochement
that found expression in the promise to withdraw from Afghanistan and also
in the ralks that lead up to the so-called Two Plus Four Treaty.
The Pre-history of the Two Plus Four Talks
July 1986
"In July 1986 six regiments, which consisted [of] up
to 15,000 troops, were withdrawn from Afghanistan. The aim of this early
withdrawal was, according to Gorbachev, to show the world that the Soviet
leadership was serious about leaving Afghanistan. [...]The Soviets told
the United States Government that they were planning to withdraw, but the
United States Government didn't believe it. When Gorbachev met with Ronald
Reagan during his visit the United States, Reagan called, bizarrely, for
the dissolution of the Afghan army [...]"(2)
April 1988
On 14 April 1988 the Afghan and Pakistani governments
signed the Geneva Accords, and the Soviet Union and the United States signed
as guarantors; the treaty specifically stated that the Soviet military
had to withdraw from Afghanistan by 15 February 1989.
January, 1990
“Gorbachev's worries[regarding the possible consequences
of German unification][...] were eased by promises from the American, French
and German government that NATO would expand no further to the east. Perhaps
he was lulled by the fact that Time magazine chose him as the "Man of
the Decade" for the first January issue, 1990, and in an accompanying
essay editor-at-large
Strobe Talcott mused that "[i]t
is about time to think seriously about eventually retiring [i.e. dissolving]
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization." [...] (3)
Peter E. Quint mentions “a crucial early suggestion
of German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, advanced in January
1990, that eastern Germany [would] forever remain free of NATO troops.
The purpose of Genscher's proposal was to help make German membership
in NATO palatable to the Soviet Union by assuring that after unification
NATO forces would not move closer to the borders of the Soviet Union
than they had been before unification.”(4)
August, 1990: The
United States launched Operation Desert Storm. On August 7, 1990, the first
U.S. troops arrived in Saudi Arabia.
The Two Plus Four Talks
September 12, 1990 The Two Plus Four Treaty between
the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), the German Democratic Republic (GDR),
and the Four Powers that occupied Germany (US, UK, F and USSR)
"Two Plus Four" Treaty Signed in Moscow
The "Treaty on the Final Settlement With Respect to Germany"
more commonly known as the "Two Plus Four Treaty" was the final peace treaty
negotiated between the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic
Republic, and the Four Powers that occupied Germany at the end of World
War II in Europe - France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the
Soviet Union.The treaty was signed in Moscow on September 12, 1990. The
treaty paved the way for the German re-unification, which took place on
October 3. Under the terms of the treaty, the Four Powers renounced all
rights they formerly held in Germany and re-united Germany became fully
sovereign again on March 15, 1991. The Soviet Union agreed to remove all
troops from Germany by the end of 1994. Germany agreed to limit its combined
armed forces to no more than 370,000 personnel, no more than 345,000 of
whom were to be in the army and air force. Germany also agreed it would
never acquire nuclear weapons. [...]
.
The countries shown in dark blue are "core" NATO countries.
The countries depicted in green were "communist countries" in 1990.
West Germany (the FRG) is depicted in bright blue; East Germany (the GDR)
in dark green. East Berlin was the capital of the GDR; West Berlin had
a special status. The promise given at the time to Mr. Gorbachev
and Mr. Shevardnadze was that NATO troops other than a limited number of
West German NATO units would not be stationed East of West Germany's borders. |
The question whether the Two Plus Four Treaty and other agreements
between Western governments and the Soviet Union precluded eastwards expansion
of NATO has given rise to controversy.
Quite obviously, Soviet leaders at the time understood the treaty (and
other assurances they were given) as a clear commitment of the West that
NATO would not expand.
Western diplomats have later said that no precise assurances were given.
The treaty and the assurances could be read in the way the Russians read
them, but they included enough gaps unnoticed by the Russians to allow
eastward expansion later on, after the unification of Germany (and Soviet
approval of unified Germany's membership in NATO) had been achieved. There
exists, however, a general consensus that the West, in 1990, wanted the
Soviet leaders to believe that a promise precluding NATO's further expansion
had been made. |
September 14, 1990 The German - Soviet Russian
"Treaty on Good Neighborliness. Partnership and Cooperation"
On September 14, 1990, Serge Schmemann wrote in the New York Times that
“[t]he Soviet Union and West Germany today initialed a broad ''treaty
on good-neighborliness, partnership and cooperation'' setting a framework
for relations between Moscow and a united Germany.Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich
Genscher of West Germany and Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze of
the Soviet Union, who initialed the document, hailed it as something of
a historic breakthrough. [...] [T]he treaty [...] consisted largely of
pledges of peace and cooperation. [...] [T]he document had been part of
the package sought by the Soviet Union in exchange for its agreement to
German unity. [...] [It amounted to a] broad statement on the shape
of future relations. [...] [A] united Germany was prepared to put its peaceful
intentions on paper. […] The preamble declared that both sides were ''resolved
to continue the good traditions of their centuries-old history,'' and spoke
of ''historic challenges on the threshold to the third millennium. […]
The document included statements banning aggression against each other
and calling for annual summit meetings, consultation in times of crisis
and expanded trade, travel and scientific cooperation. Though it had no
detailed projects, officials said separate treaties detailing economic
relations, including German financial aid for the Soviet Union and incentives
for trade and investment, were under negotiation. ''The treaty leads
both our countries into the 21st century marked by responsibility, trust
and cooperation,'' Mr. Genscher said. Mr. Shevardnadze called the treaty
a ''historic document in spirit and content,'' adding: ''Now we can rightly
say that the postwar era has ended. We are satisfied that the Federal Republic
and we again appear as partners. This is a great thing.''
Serge Schmemann, “Moscow and Bonn in a 'Good Neighbor' Pact,” in: The
New York Times, September 14, 1990 http://www.nytimes.com/1990/09/14/world/moscow-and-bonn-in-a-good-neighbor-pact.html.)
September 28, 1990
Meeting of the Representatives of the Baltic States, [in] Riga, Republic
of Latvia September 28, 1990 To the members of the United States Senate:
On September 12, 1990, the Two-Plus-Four Treaty was signed in Moscow
as a result of negotiations on Germany’s reunification. On September 13,
1990, a bilateral Treaty on "Goodneighborliness, partnership and co-operation"
was initiated in Moscow by the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of
Germany. Proceeding from those documents and taking into account the results
of the Helsinki 90 Summit between the United States and the Soviet Union,
the Baltic States welcome the reunification of Germany.
However, Article 2 of the Soviet-German Treaty of September 13, 1990,
contains principles that may be considered as acknowledging the Conquest
of the Baltic States by the Soviet Union towards the end of World War II.
The Baltic States draw attention to the dangers inherent in the
unconditional ratification of Two-Plus-Four Treaty, which should
settle the problems and borders of Germany, but should not be allowed
to freeze the USSR western borders in further bilateral treaties, thus
perpetuating a dangerous precedent.
The Baltic States further consider that border issues in post-war Europe
should not be solved only on the basis of Soviet territorial claims without
participation of the Baltic States, but by opportunities provided within
the framework of the CSCE process, and through negotiations with the Two-Plus-Four
participant states.
The rapid formation of a new security structure in Europe, based
on bilateral treaties requires us to ask the United States Senate
to express its sense in a legally binding conditional form as to
the Two-Plus-Four Treaty and the United States’ non-recognition
policy in regard to the forceful incorporation of the Baltic States into
the Soviet Union.
Endel Lippmaa
On behalf of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Estonia
Andrejs Krastins
On behalf of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia
Ceslovas Stankevicius
On behalf of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania
Source:
photocopy from original from the Popular Front of Latvia .
(Source: “To the members of the United States Senate”, in: LETTONIE
- RUSSIE, Traités et documents de base http://www.letton.ch/lvx_ap5.htm.)
“During 1990-91, the […] Warsaw Pact disappeared.” [Joseph
Laurence Black, Russia Faces NATO Expansion: Bearing Gifts Or Bearing
Arms? Lanham MD / Oxford UK (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.)
2000, p.6]
January 12, 1991
"U.S. Congress passed a joint resolution authorizing the use of military
force to drive Iraq out of Kuwait."
January 1991
Evidence of the "illegal arming of [secessionist] Croatia and
preparations for the war [was] aired on TV."
May - June 1991
Rising ethnic violence [erupted] in Croatia. Slovenia and Croatia declare[d]
independence.
September 1991
JNA forces openly attack Croat areas (primarily Dalmatia and Slavonia),
starting the Croatian War of Independence. Battle of Vukovar begins.
November 1991
“In November 1991, at the Rome Summit, the Alliance approved
a new strategic concept, which was marked by a shift from the primacy
of collective defense and a decision” in favor of interventionism;
for instance in “intra-state conflicts” (as was to happen in Yugoslavia).
"The
concept emphasized the danger of instability on NATO'S periphery […] Territorial
disputes, ethnic conflicts, and economic crises […] were among the potential
unsettling forces NATO decided to monitor" and deal with. "It
was at the Rome Summit [of 1991] that the Alliance created an institutional
mechanism for dealing with members of the rapidly disintegrating Warsaw
Treaty Organization [...]" In
order to draw Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Baltic into the orbit of NATO,
it was decided in 1991 to set up the "North Atlantic Cooperation Council
(NACC)" that would orchestrate informal military cooperation and coordination
as a first step towards full integration. [Joseph Laurence Black,
ibidem, p.8]
December 1991
The Soviet Union was dissolved on 26 December 1991
1991-1993
“the government headed by Boris Yeltsin "maintained a strongly Western
and reformist orientation. Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev pushed integration
with the West" [...]” [ Joseph Laurence Black, ibidem, p.9]
1993
Joseph L. Black claims that the Yeltsin “government "was
forced to retreat"” from its "strongly Western" course in 1993.
In Black's opinion this must be interpreted as a result of the “elections
of 1993 [that] weakened its position internally.” [ Joseph
Laurence Black, ibidem, p.9] But at the same time, Black is compelled to
admit that in 1993 the Russian leadership was concerned that “Romania
might make a grab for Moldavia, [...] and the Baltic states could follow
the Visegrad group (Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia) into the
[NATO] Alliance” into which they had been informally integrated as recently
adopted members of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council
(NACC).[ Joseph Laurence Black, p.9]
In 1993, “NATO enlargement was already perceived […] as the creation
of a buffer zone in reverse, a means to isolate the new Russia from
continental Europe.”
February 1994
“In early 1994, the unrelenting character of NATO'S plans
to recruit new members began to trigger responses at the highest
level in Russia. In February of that year, Yeltsin felt so threatened
by the possibility of NATO expanding without consulting Russia that he
emphasized his country's opposition to it in his annual message to
the Federal Assembly, and in a separate television address to the nation.[...]
The presidential statement was much stronger than an earlier recommendation
by Kozyrev that Russia work with NATO's North Atlantic Cooperation Council
"to
strengthen mutual trust and developing cooperation" as an alternative
to a "faster expansion of NATO."[…] Interestingly, in 1994 there
was a feeling within [Russian] military circles that Russia might eventually
join NATO itself.” (Joseph Laurence Black, ibidem, p.9)
Late 1996
Madeleine Albright is named first female US Secretary of State. As
UN ambassador, Albright had argued in favor of early military intervention
in Bosnia.
January 31, 1997
“Prime Minister Viktor S. Chernomyrdin of Russia assailed the expansion
of NATO today [...] ''We are warning today that NATO has not changed,''
Mr. Chernomyrdin said, referring to the Western alliance's formation as
a military bulwark against Soviet expansion during the cold war. ''Any
movement of NATO infrastructure to the Russian boundary would do no good.
Rather it would do bad.''”
Edmund C. Andrews, “Russian Hints at Compromise Over NATO”, in: The
New York Times, Jan.31, 1997. http://www.nytimes.com/1997/01/31/world/russian-hints-at-compromise-over-nato.html.)
December 1996
In December 1996, NATO foreign ministers agreed to seek an agreement
with the Russian Federation on arrangements to deepen and widen the scope
of NATO-Russian relations, primarily to offset the largely negative
impact on those relations caused by NATO's decision to enlarge.
March-July 1997
“Despite stern Russian opposition, the Western alliance is planning
a July summit in Madrid at which it expects to invite former Soviet satellites
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to join by 1999 [as full members
of NATO]. […]
Solana said in London last week that NATO and Russia were about to
start work on the text of a new strategic security partnership. Citing
unidentified diplomatic sources, Agence France Presse said Monday that
Solana had submitted to Primakov a draft "framework agreement" aimed
at easing Russian concerns about NATO. […]
Solana is to visit four Central Asian republics -- Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,
Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan [an indication of the West's attempt to establisg
a foothold in Central Asia and recruit new strategic "partners"]-- before
returning to Brussels on Saturday.” (Ian MacWilliam, “NATO, Russia
Upbeat After Solana Visit,” in: The Moscow Times, March 11, 1997).
May 14, 1997
“NATO and Russia reached tentative agreement Wednesday on a new
charter to govern relations after NATO begins its eastward expansion, a
move Moscow has opposed. The deal worked out after a second day
of talks between Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov and NATO Secretary-General
Javier Solana follows months of tough negotiations between the two former
Cold War foes and must still be approved by Russian President Boris Yeltsin
and ambassadors from NATO's 16 member nations. Final details were not immediately
available so it was not clear if all differences had been fully resolved.
Both sides hope the deal can be signed at a ceremony May 27 in Paris.”
“Until now, a breakthrough had been blocked by disagreements
over whether the pact should include written guarantees that NATO will
not station military structures and nuclear weapons on the territory of
new member states. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
has been reluctant to give such guarantees in writing. Shea said
the deal provides assurances to Russia that "the forthcoming enlargement
of NATO is not going to lead to any negative military consequences for
Russia." […] Yeltsin has said he would not sign an unsatisfactory
agreement and told Primakov to take a tough line in the sixth round of
Russia-NATO talks on the pact. Yeltsin had also said repeatedly that
Russia would not back NATO's plans to invite some Eastern European countries
to join the alliance at a summit in Madrid in July. Poland, Hungary
and the Czech Republic are expected to receive the first invitations to
join NATO, though Romania and Slovenia also hope to be in the first
wave. Moscow regards enlargement as a security threat.
”
(N.N., [with Moscow Bureau Chief Jill Dougherty, Correspondent
Betsy Aaron and REUTERS all contributing to this report], “NATO and
Russia reach partnership pact,” in: CNN, May 14, 1997.
http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9705/14/russia.nato/.)
May 27, 1997: The Founding Act
“On May 27 in Paris, Russian President Boris Yeltsin
joined President Bill Clinton and the leaders of the 15 other NATO member
states in signing the "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation
and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation."”
“[...] the Act "defines the goals and mechanism
of consultation, cooperation, joint decision-making and joint action that
will constitute the core of the mutual relations between NATO and Russia."
The Act establishes a NATO-Russian Permanent Joint
Council which is to begin functioning by the end of September 1997]. The
Act also contains NATO's qualified pledge not to deploy nuclear
weapons or station troops in the new member states and refines the basic
"scope
and parameters" for an adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
(CFE) Treaty.”
“[...] In the second section, which contains the only
concrete action in the Act, NATO and Russia establish the NATO-Russian
Permanent Joint Council. The Council is intended as "a mechanism
for consultations, coordination and, ...where appropriate, for joint decisions
and joint action with respect to security issues of common concern."”
“In the final section of the Act, which deals with political-military
matters, NATO restates that it has "no intention, no plan and no reason,"
[at the moment] to deploy or store nuclear weapons on the territory
of new members. [...]”
“[T]he Act notes that NATO will "carry out
its collective defence and other missions by ensuring the necessary
interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather
than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces."
[...] But, the Act cautions, NATO "will have to rely on adequate
infrastructure commensurate with the above tasks."”
|
“[D]espite its intention "to overcome the vestiges of past confrontation
and competition and to strengthen mutual trust and cooperation" (in
the words of Solana), the Founding Act was and is viewed by many in Russia
[...] with decided ambivalence.”
“The first section of the Act elaborates the basic principles for establishing
common and comprehensive security in Europe. These principles include strengthening
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), responding
to new risks and challenges "such as aggressive nationalism, proliferation...,
terrorism, [and] persistent abuse of human rights...," and basing
NATO-Russian relations on a shared commitment to democracy, political
pluralism, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and the development
of free market economies.
NATO and Russia also pledge to refrain from the threat or use of force
against each other or other states, to respect the independence and territorial
integrity of all states and the inviolability of borders, to foster mutual
transparency, to settle disputes by peaceful means and to support, "on
a case-by-case basis" [...], peacekeeping operations carried out under
the UN Security Council.”
“At the signing ceremony, [...] Yeltsin described the Act as containing
"an
obligation not to deploy NATO combat forces on a permanent basis near Russia,"
and as "a firm and absolute commitment for all signatory states." [US-]Administration
officials, on the other hand, made it very clear they consider the Act
to
be only politically, and not legally, binding
and therefore not
requiring Senate approval. Jeremy Rosner, Special Assistant to the President
for NATO Enlargement, said, "the Founding Act itself states explicitly
that the Act does not limit NATO's ability to act independently, and it
does not apply—it's not legally binding —doesn't apply any limitations
on NATO's military policy from the outside."” |
1998
In 1998 the Duma adopted a statement which made it clear “that Russia's
security arrangement and relations with the [North Atlantic Treatry Organization]
Alliance would have to be reviewed if NATO changed its stance towards the
Baltic countries, especially Latvia.”
The Russian reaction was partly due to the fact that the Latvian
government “granted permission to veterans of the Latvian voluntary
SS Legion to celebrate its 55th anniversary (Interfax, 16 March).”
Soon after the old members of the SS had received permission for
an official celebration of their voluntary and eager participation
in Hitler Germany's war of aggression and in repeated acts of genocide,
a war memorial that served to remind people of the fact that the Red Army
had paid a high price in order to defeat Hitler's Wehrmacht, was vandalized
in Latvia. (Joseph Laurence Black, ibidem, p. 215)
NATO emissaries and Western diplomats nonetheless continued their concerted
effort to integrate Latvia (as well as Lithuania and Estonia) into the
Western alliance. In July 1998, “Strobe Talbott's participation
in the first session of the Commission for Partnership between the
United States and the Baltic Countries” [Black, ibidem, p.219]
was an indication that the US were working determinedly to achieve NATO
integration. “Talbott endorsed a communiqué which
implied that the Baltic countries were prepared for entry into NATO.”
(Black,ibidem, p.219) Clearly, “the United States
was ignoring Russia's hope for a “blockless” European security system.”
(Joseph Laurence Black, ibidem, p.219)
[1998]
J.L. Black mentions “Russia's [...] proposals, in Stockholm,
of a northern secturity system” and the fact that this was “summarily
dismissed by Sweden and the Baltic states [….]”.
In 1998, Norway expelled five Russian diplomats on charges of spying,
as that country got ready for “a large scale NATO military exercise (Strong
Resolve 98), the venue of which was Norway, the North Sea, and the
Norwegian Sea […].” For observers in Russia it was clear that
“the expulsion of Russian diplomats” was linked “directly to the war
games.” (Joseph Laurence Black, ibidem, p.216)
“In May [1998], Adamkus informed a Russian interviewer that Lithuania's
aspiration to join NATO should not be viewed as opposition to Russia. He
went on to predict that Russia itself would eventually join"NATO
as the all- European security system." [...]
Solana told a Russian NTV audience on 26 May that whereas “every
country has the right to choose security structures in which it wants to
participate,” NATO will “take Russia's opinion [about Baltic entry]
into account.”[...]
In June, he went so far as to moot Russian membership and spoke
tentatively, while visiting the Baltic capitals, of the possibility
of a separate security scheme for the Baltic region to include Russia.
This
concept, even though speculative, cheered some Russian observers.[...]
Russia itself was encouraged to play a greater role in NATO activities,
a fact evidenced by an agreement that a platoon of Baltic Fleet marines
would join a military exercise in Northern Denmark in late May, and
that Russia would send observers to the Baltic Challenge 98,
a NATO maneuver scheduled for Lithuania in July.[...]” (Joseph
Laurence Black, inbidem, p.217)
In view of the obvious fact that the West was bent on including Lithuania,
Latvia and Estland in its NATO military alliance, Russia's government made
it quite clear that “military integration of the Baltic countries with
NATO was unacceptable.” (Joseph Laurence Black, ibidem,, p.219)
The US elites wanted the continuation of a bloc dominated by them,
and they wanted to exclude Russia from membership in that bloc.
“A large-scale NATO exercise near Klaipeda was being projected and
NATO's plans to set up a corps headquarters in Poland's Szczecin
were ominous. Spokesmen for the Russian military claimed that the new corps
represented a direct violation of Article IV of theFounding Act.”
[Joseph Laurence Black, ibidem, p.219]
Jan. 13, 1998
Renewed crisis in Iraq as President Saddam Hussein bans weapons team
led by US inspector.
Feb. 23, 1998
US diplomat Robert Gelbard publicly calls KLA [Kosova Liberation Army
= UCK] "without any question a terrorist group"
Aug. 20, 1998
US launches cruise missile attack on Afghanistan and Sudan
in response to Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam embassy bombings. In polls,
significant numbers of Americans say they believe the attacks were staged
to divert attention from the Lewinsky scandal.
Sept 23, 1998
UN Security Council approves Resolution 1199 demanding cease-fire,
Serb withdrawal and refugee return and calling for unspecified "additional
measures" if Serbia refuses to comply.
Sept.24, 1998
In Vilamoura, Portugal, NATO Defense Ministers give NATO's Supreme
Commander permission to issue an activation warning (ACTWARN) -- the first
real step in preparation for airstrikes.
Sept. 30, 1998
At principals committee meeting, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
pushes for airstrikes against Serbia. Administration briefs Capitol Hill
on the plan. Meeting Congressional resistance, the Administration notes
it has no plans to send ground troops to Kosovo, even as peacekeepers.
March 9, 1998
"Contact Group" countries (US, UK, France, Germany, Italy and Russia)
meet in London to discuss Kosovo.
Jan.15, 1999
The Racak Massacre. In retaliation for KLA attack on 4 policemen, Serb
security forces kill 45 Kosovo Albanians. KVM Director William Walker arrives
on scene following day, forcefully blames Serbia in front of television
cameras. Milosevic refuses to allow war crimes prosecutor Judge Louise
Arbour to visit Racak.
Jan. 19, 1999
In light of Racak massacre, National Security Adviser Sandy Berger
reconvenes Principals Committee. Albright's push for military ultimatum
wins the day. At same time, NATO SACEUR Wesley Clark and NATO military
council chairman Gen. Klaus Naumann meet with Milosevic in Serbia in tense
seven-hour meeting. Milosevic claims Racak was staged by the KLA, calls
Clark a war criminal.
Jan. 27, 1999
Joint statement on Kosovo by Albright and Russia's Ivanov. Clinton
meets with foreign policy team to discuss post-Racak strategy.
Mar.24, 1999 The Kosovo air war begins.
April 28, 1999
House of Representatives votes largely along party lines to reject
a resolution supporting air war, demonstrating continuing mistrust of
Clinton and his Balkans policy.
May 7, 1999
In night of extensive bombing, NATO planes [...] target Chinese Embassy
in Belgrade, killing 3 and wounding 20. [...] In a separate incident, a
NATO cluster bomb misses an airfield and strikes a market and a hospital
near Nis
May 11, 1999
Chernomyrdin and Jiang Zemin confer in Beijing, criticize bombing.
May 27, 1999
In secret Bonn meeting, US Defense Sec. Cohen meets with NATO defense
ministers to discuss possible invasion; allies conclude that governments
must decide soon whether to assemble ground troops. International War Crimes
Tribunal announces indictment of Milosevic and four other FRY and Serbian
officials.
May 30, 1999
NATO bombs a bridge in Varvarin, killing and wounding civilians on
board a passenger train that was crossing the bridge..
June 1, 1999
Final round of talks between Talbott, Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari
begins. Discussion continues up until negotiators depart for Belgrade two
days later. FRY informs Germany of its readiness to accept G8 principles
for ending bombing.
June 8, 1999
During G8 talks in Cologne, allies and Russia reach agreement on possible
UN resolution to sanction the peace deal.
June 9, 1999
After more discussions, NATO and FRY officials finally initial a Military
Technical Agreement to govern the Serb withdrawal from Kosovo.
June 10, 1999
Solana requests suspension of NATO bombing, and the Security Council
adopts resolution 1244 permitting the deployment of the international
civil and military authorities in Kosovo.
June 12, 1999
In a move that surprises allied commanders, approximately 200 Russian
troops leave Bosnia, travel through Serbia and enter Kosovo before NATO,
taking control of Pristina airport.
Oct. 7, 2001
October 7: (9 p.m. local time): the United States, supported by
Britain, begins its attack on Afghanistan, launching bombs and cruise
missiles against Taliban military and communications facilities and suspected
terrorist training camps. Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat were hit.
In 2002, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1441
which called for Iraq to completely cooperate with UN weapon inspectors
to
verify that Iraq was not in possession of WMD and cruise missiles.
[March 2003]
The Second Gulf War usually refers to the Iraq War (March 2003
to December 2011), a two-phase conflict comprising an initial invasion
of Iraq led by US and UK forces and a longer, seven-year phase of occupation
and fighting with insurgents.
[April 22-23, 2010]
“Foreign Minister Urmas Paet met with president of the
USA think tank the Brookings Institution and former American under secretary
of state Strobe Talbott and former foreign policy leader of the
European Union Javier Solana to discuss Estonia’s activities
in NATO and the European Union and developments in Russia, Ukraine
and Georgia. Foreign Minister Urmas Paet stated that Strobe
Talbott’s work as an important creator of American foreign policy during
the presidency of Bill Clinton set a foundation for Estonia and many
other nations to join NATO. “Now, as a member of NATO and the European
Union, Estonia has become a strong supporter of extending of the values
of these organisations,” said Paet. “We feel it is especially
important to share our experiences with acceding states. Estonia and other
like-minded nations are attempting to support the European Union’s Eastern
Partners and keep them in focus. Within the framework of these endeavours,
we plan to establish an Eastern Partnership training
centre at Tallinn’s Estonian
School of Diplomacy,”
said Foreign Minister Paet. Paet noted that co-operation and exchanging
ideas with various think tanks, including the experts at the Brookings
Institute, will certainly be helpful for the establishment of the training
centre. Another topic discussed was European Union-USA co-operation. According
to Foreign Minister Urmas Paet, close co-operation between the European
Union and the USA is the basis for stability, economic growth, and lasting
development in the Euro-Atlantic region.[...]” (N.N.,“[Estonian] Foreign
Minister Paet Met with Javier Solana and Strobe Talbott”, in: http://www.vm.ee/?q=en/node/9282
[Press Release on the occasion of an official meeting in Talinn, April
22-23, 2010])
Olivier Zajec, "The Good Ones, the Brute and Crimea:
The Anti-Russian Obsession,"
in: Le Monde diplomatique, Vol. 61, No. 721 (April, 2014),
p. 1 and p.4.
September 2012
In 2012, the Los Angeles Times reported former Presidential candidate
Mitt Romney as saying that “Russia is a geopolitical adversary
[…] My own view is that Russia has a very different agenda than ours and
that we ought to recognize that, and that we should pursue our interests,
but recognize Russia as having a different course.” (Mitchell Landsberg
and Robin Abcarian, “Mitt Romney Calls Russia 'Geopolitical Adversary',”
in: The Los Angeles Times, Sept.10,2012 http://articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/10/news/la-pn-mitt-romney-russia-syria-20120910.)
March 23, 2014
“Russia's adversarial behaviour neccesitates a strategic response,
General Philip Breedlove, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) has
said. […] As for NATO's future, he said Crimea means: "changing
our deployment, readiness and force structure. We have moved F-16s from
Italy to Poland and the Baltics and we have shifted some of our naval assets
to be engaged in the Black Sea. There are other things we are considering
but I cannot make that public right now." Asked if the alliance
should put countervailing pressure on Moscow by conducting exercises close
to the border of Kaliningrad, its enclave in the Baltic region, Breedlove
said no. "I don't think that would be a good idea. There are lots of
ways we can position forces by moving them eastward to reassure our allies.
But having an exercise around Kaliningrad would be very escalatory and
not help things," he said. ” (Brooks Tigner, “Russia behaving 'like
an adversary', says SACEUR,” in: IHS Jane's Defence Weekly, March
23, 2014 http://www.janes.com/article/35841/russia-behaving-like-an-adversary-says-saceur.)
In March, 2014, “Mr. Romney's assertion in the 2012 presidential debates
that Russia was America's top geopolitical foe […]” was practically a repeat
of what Romney had said in 2012. (Mark Sappenfield, “Mitt Romney: Russia
not an enemy, it's 'our geopolitical adversary.',” in: The Christian Science
Monitor, March 23, 2014 http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/2014/0323/Mitt-Romney-
Russia-not-an-enemy-it-s-our-geopolitical-adversary.-Huh-video.)
March 24, 2014
“MADRID – Even Mikhail Gorbachev, who presided over the dissolution
of the Soviet Union with scarcely a shot fired, has proclaimed his support
for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s annexation of Crimea. The people
of Crimea, he says, have corrected a historic Soviet error. Gorbachev’s
sentiment is widely shared in Russia. [...]”
Javier Solana, “Stabilizing Ukraine”, in: Project Syndicat, March 24,
2014. http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/javier-solana-identities-three-issues-
that-must-be-addressed-in-the-wake-of-russia-s-annexation-of-crimea
April 1, 2014
“Although Russia’s President Vladimir Putin’s saber rattling is attempting
to restore some of the splintered Soviet Empire, and restoring its grandeur
as a Eurasian power to be reckoned with, that train has long passed. […]
as a long-term adversary to the U.S., Russia is no match. […] The obvious
ascending economic superpower of this century’s second half is destined
to be China. Its incredible growth is also, surprisingly, developing
a consumer demand populace, second only to the U.S. today. Even in the
military sector, which the U.S. has dominated since the second world war,
China is rapidly expanding, while the U.S. is diminishing. What seems
to make China less of a geopolitical threat than Russia is that Beijing
does not now harbor confrontation with the European Union, or the West
in general. It is thereby not threatening the U.S.’s integral NATO and
Eurocom Alliance, or other direct interests. But this could change
[...]” (Morris Beschloss, “Is Russia or China America’s Most Dangerous
Geopolitical Adversary?,” in: The Desert Sun (A Gannett Company newspaper),
April 1, 2014 http://www.desertsun.com/story/beschloss/2014/04/01/is-russia-or-china-
americas-most-dangerous-geopolitical-adversary/7174573/.)
April 6, 2014
N. Krainova points out different assessments of “the new government
in Kiev, which Moscow has said is illegitimate but the West recognizes.”
She then goes on to say that “EU foreign ministers met in Athens to discuss
the ongoing Ukraine crisis [...] as NATO prepares to boost its military
presence in Europe” “Concerned about possible military aggression from
Russia, Poland has asked NATO for protection. Polish Prime Minister Donald
Tusk said Saturday that "the strengthening of NATO's presence [in Poland],
also military presence, has become a fact and will be visible in the coming
days, weeks," Reuters reported. NATO will draft a plan for the deployment
of its forces by mid-April. NATO's plans for Poland were publicized a day
after Russia recalled its top military representative to NATO, General
Valery Yevnevich, for consultations. Russia, for its part, apparently
sought to ease Poland's fears last Thursday.” (Natalya Krainova, “Protesters
Storm Buildings in Ukraine as West Ponders Next Move,” in: The Moscow Times,
Apr. 6, 2014)
:
Regarding the Soviet débâcle in Afghanistan
that was one of the factors leading to Gorbachev's decision to seek an
end to the Cold War, see for instance:
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1499983/Soviet-invasion-of-Afghanistan
- Jan van Houten (compiler)
Go to Art
in Society # 14, Contents
* |
.
(1) In hindsight, it is possible to say that Ostpolitik and
the arms race, employed by the West, functioned like the proverbial carrot
and the stick. |
(2) Source: N.N., “Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, ”, in:
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/
1499983/Soviet-invasion-of-Afghanistan |
(3) Joseph Laurence Black, Russia Faces NATO Expansion: Bearing
Gifts Or Bearing Arms? Lanham MD / Oxford UK (Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, Inc.) 2000, p.7 |
(4) “[A] crucial early suggestion of German Foreign Minister
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, advanced in January 1990, [was] that eastern Germany
[would] forever remain free of NATO troops. The purpose of Genscher's proposal
was to help make German membership in NATO palatable to the Soviet Union
by assuring that after unification NATO forces would not move
closer to the borders of the Soviet Union than they had been
before unification.”
(Peter E. Quint, The Imperfect Union: Constitutional Structures of
German Unification, PrincetonNJ (Princeton Univ.Press) 1997, p.273.) |
In January, 1990, thus during the period leading up to the Two Plus
Four Treaty, “a crucial [...] suggestion” regarding the “military status
of eastern Germany had been made by German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich
Genscher” in a conversation with Gorbachev. Genscher had said “that
eastern Germany [should] forever remain free of NATO troops. The purpose
of Genscher's proposal was to help make German membership in NATO
palatable to the Soviet Union by assuring that after unification NATO forces
would not move closer to the borders of the Soviet Union than they had
been before unification. But "as a result of western – particularly
American – influence," the final agreement did not make as much of
a concession to the Soviet Union on this point as Genscher had originally
proposed.” Gorbachev agreed that Germany should be fully sovereign but
no NATO troops other than a limited number of German units integrated in
NATO should be stationed in what had been the GDR (so-called East Germany).
(Peter E. Quint, The Imperfect Union: Constitutional Structures of German
Unification, PrincetonNJ (Princeton Univ.Press) 1997, p.273.) |
“The "Treaty on the Final Settlement With Respect to Germany" more
commonly known as the "Two Plus Four Treaty" was the final peace treaty
negotiated between the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic
Republic, and the Four Powers that occupied Germany at the end of World
War II in Europe - France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the
Soviet Union.The treaty was signed in Moscow on September 12, 1990. The
treaty paved the way for the German re-unification, which took place on
October 3. Under the terms of the treaty, the Four Powers renounced all
rights they formerly held in Germany and re-united Germany became fully
sovereign again on March 15, 1991. The Soviet Union agreed to remove all
troops from Germany by the end of 1994. Germany agreed to limit its combined
armed forces to no more than 370,000 personnel, no more than 345,000 of
whom were to be in the army and air force. Germany also agreed it would
never acquire nuclear weapons. [...]”
(The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars http://legacy.wilsoncenter.org/coldwarfiles/index
-58013.html.) |
“[T]he four Allied powers [...]declared that they "hereby terminate
their rights and responsibilities relating to Berlin and to Germany as
a whole" [….] Consequently, "the united Germany shall have
… full sovereignty over its internal and external affairs." [...]”
(Peter E. Quint, The Imperfect Union: Constitutional Structures of German
Unification, PrincetonNJ (Princeton Univ.Press) 1997, p.275) |
“In accordance with the agreement reached by Kohl and Gorbachev in
the Caucasus, article 6 of the Two Plus Four agreement permits united Germany
to belong to “alliances, with all the rights and responsibilities arising
from them.” (Peter E. Quint, The Imperfect Union: Constitutional Structures
of German Unification, PrincetonNJ (Princeton Univ.Press) 1997, p. 273) |
“[According] to article 5, section 3 [of the Two Plus Four Treaty],
German troops, including German troops integrated in NATO, could be stationed
in former GDR territory after the withdrawal of Soviet troops, but foreign
troops may never be stationed in that territory, nor may they be "deployed"
there.
Thus, after the departure of Soviet troops, only German NATO forces, but
not NATO forces of other nations, may be stationed or deployed in eastern
Germany. Accordingly, one part of unified Germany – the territory of the
former GDR – will remain under permanent limitations with respect
to the presence of foreign armed forces.” (Peter E. Quint, The Imperfect
Union: Constitutional Structures of German Unification, PrincetonNJ (Princeton
Univ.Press) 1997, p. 273)
“As a consequence of German unification, “NATO's domain was extended
eastward to include the territory of the former GDR.” [Joseph Laurence
Black, Russia Faces NATO Expansion: Bearing Gifts Or Bearing Arms?
2000, p.6] |
Commenting on the German Soviet Treaty of Sept 14, 1990, Serge Schmemann
also noted that "Western diplomats" played down the significance of promises
of partnership and cooperation, saying that the wording of the treaty "was
for domestic consumption [in Russia], to demonstrate to a nation reared
on the accounts of Soviet sacrifices in World War II that a united Germany
was prepared to put its peaceful intentions on paper." The New York Times
probably echoed statements by U.S. diplomats when it emphasized that "the
treaty included few concrete agreements" - suggesting in fact that the
"pledges of peace and cooperation" were mere words without much concrete
significance. (Serge Schmemann, “Moscow and Bonn in a 'Good Neighbor' Pact,”
in: The New York Times, September 14, 1990) |
In January 1992, the so-called Vance peace plan was signed that was
supposed to lead to the creation of 4 UNPA zones for Serb-controlled
territories, and that brought an end to large-scale military operations
in Croatia. UNPROFOR forces arrived to monitor the peace treaty.
In February-March 1992, the Carrington–Cutileiro peace plan marked an
attempt to prevent Bosnia-Herzegovina from sliding into war. It proposed
ethnic power-sharing on all administrative levels and the devolution of
central government to local ethnic communities. On March 18, 1992,
all three sides signed the agreement but ten days later, Alija Izetbegovic,who
represented the Bosniak (Muslim) side, withdrew his signature and declared
his opposition to any type of partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina. A day
later, the government led by Izetbegovic declared independence and
the war began.
|
“[T]he German government's efforts to create national military command
and planning structures, or a Fuehrungs- kommando [...]” [p.228]
[had] “the purpose […] to facilitate German particpationin
multilateral out-of-area military operations
that are not under NATO command. [….] No longer restricted
to the defense of German territory, the Bundeswehr
has been deployed
for an increasingly wide range of out of area missions. [...] [H]owever,
one must […] differentiate between […] willful use of force [a]
in the pursuit of national interests” and [b] German participation
in military interventions
“dictated by the pressures
[….] and […] expectations of Germany's partners” – notably the U.S. [or
France, in the context of interventions in the Sahel zone]. [p.229]
(John S. Duffield, World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International
Institutions, and German Security Policy After Unification. Stanford
CA (Stanford University Press) 1998.)
. |
“Peter Rodman of the Nixon Center, echoing
conservatives in Congress and the press, argued that the Act "promises
to complicate NATO decision-making in future crises in Europe or the Middle
East." He acknowledges, "it's not at all clear that we bought Russian acquiescence
in NATO enlargement..." but concludes, "having paid this price to the Russians,
we have no choice but to go forward. The worst of all worlds would be to
have paid this price and then not proceed with the NATO project to be launched
at Madrid."
The Act's reception among Russians was equally diverse. While in
Paris, Yeltsin praised the document. But on the eve of the Act's signature,
Yeltsin cautioned that NATO would "fully undermine" its relations with
Russia if it expanded to include any of the former Soviet Republics,
generally understood to pertain to the Baltics and Ukraine. (Foreign
Minister Primakov said Russia remains "categorically against" NATO expansion
to include any former Soviet republics.) Sandy Berger, the president's
National Security Advisor, when briefing the press four days after
the Paris Summit, said, "We have made it very clear in the Founding
Act and in all of our discussions publicly and privately with the Russians
that we don't believe that any nation is or should be excluded from
potential membership in NATO if they meet the criteria and they seek
to be members."
Yeltsin, in his radio address to the Russian people on May 30, described
the Act as an effort "to minimize the negative consequences of NATO's expansion
and prevent a new split in Europe." He then described the agreement—inaccurately,
according to Western officials—as "enshrining NATO's pledge not
to deploy nuclear weapons on the territories of its new member countries,
not
[to] build up its armed forces near our borders...nor carry out
relevant infrastructure preparations."”
(Jack Mendelsohn, “The NATO Russian Founding Act,” in:
The Arms Control Association https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997_05/jm.) |
REGARDING THE RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP'S VIEW OF NATO EXPANSION, see:
Viktoriia Ivanova, “Rasshirenie NATO bylo i ostaetsia nepriemlemym”
[NATO Expansion Was and Remains Unacceptable], in: Nezavisimaia gazeta,
May 14, 1998.
Aleksei Baliev, “Protiv kogo druzhat Amerika s Baltiei?” [Against Whom
Did America Become Friendly with the Baltics?], in: Rossiiskaia gazeta,
July 17, 1998.
Nikolai Lashkevich, “NATO uzhe pod Klaipedoi” [NATO Already Near Klaipeda],
in: Izvestiia, July 10, 1998.
Igor Korotchenko, “Al'ians ukrepliaet pozitsii na Baltike. Formirovanie
datsko-pol'sko-germanskogo korpusa pereshlo v zavershaiushchuiu fazu” [The
Alliance Strengthens Its Position on the Baltic: The Formation of a Danish-Polish-German
Corps Moves towards Completion], in: Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, No,
48, Dec.17-24, 1998. |
As editor-at-large of Time magazine, Strobe Talbott had
said (in the first January issue of 1990) that "[i]t is about
time to think seriously about eventually retiring [i.e. dissolving] the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization." (Joseph Laurence Black, ibidem,
p.7) As a member of an important Cold War think-tank and a career diplomat,
Talbott may have been playing his pre-meditated role of "lulling"
Gorbachev whom he made "man of the year" in January 1990. Others involved
in such sweet-talk were Mr. Genscher and Mr. Kohl. Gorbachev was deeply
concerned that the arms race and the concomitant tension could lead to
accidental unleashing of a nuclear holocaust. He, like others in the Soviet
leadership, had also become thoroughly social-democratic ideologically,
seeking a "third way" characterized by democracy and a "socialist market
economy" - the latter a tendency that took into account "consumerist" desires
of the common people, sweeping aside rigorous bureaucratic central planning.The
decisive weakening of rigorous central planning and the transformation
of the plan into a broad framework that left much to the dynamics of the
market had been the central objective of the economic reforms that were
based on proposals by Prof. Liberman. Gorbachev and others seem to have
thought that the West German welfare state that had been strengthened by
the Brandt government came pretty close to their own idea of reformed "socialism."
They took the promises of West German Ostpolitik at face value,
and as fairly idealistic humanists they hoped for a real understanding,
a true entente, and especially - quite concretely - stepped-up economic,
scientific and cultural cooperation with an eventually united Germany.
It was clear to them that real entente required the dissolution of military
alliances (both the Warsaw Pact and NATO had to be dissolved). This, to
them, was a matter of good will and honesty. |
[The Gulf War of 2003ff.]
Prior to the war, the governments of the United States and the United
Kingdom claimed that Iraq's alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) posed a threat to their security and that of their coalition/regional
allies.[...]
In 2002, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1441
which called for Iraq to completely cooperate with UN weapon inspectors
to verify that Iraq was not in possession of WMD and cruise missiles. Prior
to the attack, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection
Commission (UNMOVIC) found no evidence of WMD, but could not yet verify
the accuracy of Iraq's declarations regarding what weapons it possessed,
as their work was still unfinished. The leader of the inspectors, Hans
Blix, estimated the time remaining for disarmament being verified through
inspections to be "months".
After further investigation had been undertaken, subsequent
to the illegal invasion, the US-led Iraq Survey Group concluded that
Iraq had ended its nuclear, chemical and biological programs in 1991 [...].
|
|